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Cogn. Sci. 16, 504–510.
In a recent article entitled “When the
world becomes ‘too real’: Bayesian expla-
nation of autistic perception,” Elizabeth
Pellicano and David Burr (Pellicano and
Burr, 2012b) introduce an intriguing new
hypothesis, a Bayesian account, concern-
ing the possible origins of perceptual
deficits in Autism Spectrum Disorder
(ASD). This Bayesian account explains
why ASD impacts perception in systematic
ways, but it does not clearly explain how.
Most prominently, the Bayesian account
lacks connections to the neural compu-
tation performed by the brain, and does
not provide mechanistic explanations for
ASD (Rust and Stocker, 2010; Colombo
and Series, 2012). Nor does the Bayesian
account explain what the biological ori-
gin is of the “prior”—the essential addi-
tion of the Bayesian models. In Marr’s
terminology (Marr, 1982), Pellicano and
Burr paper proposes a computational-level
explanation for ASD, but not an account
for the other two levels, representation and
implementation. We propose that a pre-
dictive coding framework (schematized in
Figure 1) may fill the gap and generate a
testable framework open to further exper-
imental investigations.
In Pellicano and Burr’s general
Bayesian approach, perception is
based on the integration of stimu-
lus information (encapsulated in the
likelihood) and regularizing (contextual)
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation of the predictive coding framework. Input arrives from
the sensory organs, and is processed in a “low-level” area. This processed information is sent to a
higher area. Based on this input the higher area tries to explain, and predict the sensory data, and
feeds back a prediction. The prediction is more or less equivalent to the “prior” in the Bayesian
framework. The prediction is subtracted from the activity at the lower level, and the residual is the
“prediction error.” The prediction error may be equivalent to “exogenous attention.” Finally,
endogenous attention may influence the feedforward information.
information based on previous experience
(the “prior”). Often, the prior draws per-
ception away from the veridical stimu-
lus characteristics [e.g., people perceive
a Kanizsa triangle above three circles,
instead of three pac-men: see Figure 1 in
Pellicano and Burr (2012b)]. Pellicano and
Burr suggest that people with ASD have
weak priors compared to the typically-
developing population, explaining a key
finding that autistic observers are less
influenced by contextual information, and
hence see the world more accurately (as
it actually is), as their perception is less
modulated by experience. This Bayesian
account provides an explanation for the
bias favoring local over global processing
in ASD.
The predictive coding framework pro-
vides a natural implementation of the
prior used in the Bayesian model proposed
by Pellicano and Burr. In predictive coding
schemes, higher brain areas attempt to
“explain” input from lower brain areas,
and then project these predictions down
to lower areas, where the predicted sensory
information is subtracted from the input
(i.e., predicted information is discounted).
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This feedback operates in a hierarchi-
cal manner (Figure 1), and the predic-
tions fed-back to lower areas constitute the
(empirically-derived) “priors” (Feldman
and Friston, 2010). Such empirical pri-
ors have been computationally imple-
mented (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Feldman
and Friston, 2010), and thus are open to
experimental scrutiny. An added advan-
tage of this framework is that it naturally
explains the often-observed decrease in
global processing in people with ASD, and
concomitant increase in local processing
(Happé and Frith, 2006; Mottron et al.,
2006).
The predictive coding framework
also provides an elegant way to imple-
ment both endogenous (top-down) and
exogenous (bottom-up) attention within
the same framework. The framework can
therefore guide detailed investigations of
whether perceptual deficits in ASD are due
to malfunctioning of certain higher-level
brain areas, or instead due to an atten-
tional bias toward lower-level stimulus
characteristics (Plaisted, 2001; Mottron
et al., 2006).
Exogenous attention is linked to the
prediction error in the predictive coding
framework. Specifically, when the predic-
tions (“priors”) do not match the input,
expectations are violated, and a predic-
tion error (i.e., the difference between the
expected and the observed sensory infor-
mation) is generated at lower levels. The
prediction error constitutes a “surprise”
(Feldman and Friston, 2010), which can
be thought of as a trigger for exogenous
attention. With decreased high-level pro-
cessing in ASD (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2004;
Happé and Frith, 2006), predictions are
presumably less precise (or less strong, i.e.,
hypo-priors; Pellicano and Burr, 2012b),
and thus prediction errors (“surprises”)
will increase. As a result, the sensory sys-
tems of people with ASDwill be constantly
bombarded by new “surprises”, and hence
overloaded with sensory stimulation.
Endogenous attention can also be
readily included in the predictive coding
framework as amodulation of feedforward
information (as explained in Feldman
and Friston, 2010). Empirical evidence
for such modulation exists (Zhang and
Luck, 2009). Within the predictive cod-
ing framework, decreased influence
of higher visual areas on perception,
manifested in decreased activity (e.g.,
Belmonte et al., 2004; Schultz, 2005)
or decreased (functional) connectiv-
ity (Just et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2011),
could be due to decreased function-
ing of higher levels, or alternatively to
decreased endogenous modulation of
attention (Mottron et al., 2006), or both.
Developing quantitative computational
models may help us disentangle these
possibilities.
The predictive coding framework may
also provide valuable insights into the
developmental origins of ASD. Because
of the recurrent nature of the predictive
coding framework, it is possible that a
dysfunction in one level causes a dys-
function in another level, which in turn
feeds back to create a vicious circle. If this
cycle occurs during development, it could
potentially spiral out of control, contribut-
ing to ASD. Such scenarios go beyond
a simple Bayesian account based on pri-
ors and likelihoods and could be investi-
gated with computational models in the
future (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Feldman
and Friston, 2010).
Finally, in a recent comment on
Pellicano and Burr’s paper, Brock (Brock,
2012) suggested that instead of hypo-
priors, one may assume that people
with ASD have reduced sensory noise.
Although this is theoretically possible,
Pellicano and Burr countered (Pellicano
and Burr, 2012a) that there is in fact
experimental evidence for increased neu-
ral noise in ASD. We would add that
the hypothesis of reduced sensory noise
also predicts a reduced variance in the
intra-individual perceptual responses
to identical (visual) stimuli, whereas a
hypo-prior would be associated with an
increase in variance. Although the lit-
erature on this issue is not extensive,
intra-individual response time variabil-
ity is reportedly greater in ASD than
in the typical population (Geurts et al.,
2008).
In summary, the predictive coding
framework complements the Bayesian
approach introduced by Pellicano and
Burr, providing a general account of why
certain perceptual, and potentially social
deficits (cf., Kilner et al., 2007) exist, and
how biological substrates and computa-
tional mechanisms can give rise to these
deficits in ASD.
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